Abstract : Grand strategic theorists share an historical emphasis on interstate conflict. However, of some two hundred and seventy-three US military deployments since 1900, only seven were interstate conflicts. The rest were intrastate, domestic level engagements. We argue that these intrastate conflicts limit the utility of regional balances of power in mitigating forms of conflict that the US may consider inimical to its national security interests. When considering potential changes to US force posture and grand strategy, American coercive statecraft should be theorised along a broader strategic continuum encompassing the full range of conflict.
Whilst debates on US grand strategy tend to disagree over the options and risks associated with either retrenchment or deep engagement, they share an emphasis on interstate warfare in their respective analyses. This interstate focus informs the often diametrically opposed calls for changes in US force posture and grand strategy and is justifiable given the fact that historically it has been both the most destructive and transformative of international relations. Attendant US grand strategies thus place interstate conflict at the core of US national security interests. 1 However, as Brooks and Wolhforth note, 'grand strategy's implications for nonstate and transnational policy challenges like terrorism tend to be indirect -though crucial'. We agree 2 with this. Aside from the capacity for intrastate wars to pull the US into larger interstate conflicts or to trigger forms of regional instability, in terms of historical regularity these smaller forms of conflict have often been the principal focus of US overseas military missions. Since 1900 only seven of the two hundred and seventy-three US military deployments were in fact interstate conflicts, with the remaining being smaller scale strikes and intrastate interventions. In short, a 3 significant proportion of US coercive statecraft has for over a century been directed towards unconventional and asymmetric intrastate interventions. Whilst there is a plethora of strategic scholarship on small wars, terrorism, insurgency and so on, these pervasive forms of conflict have often only found their way into the grand strategy scholarship in fleeting and tangential ways. This is both an interesting empirical and theoretical lacunae. Does the inclusion of these 4 smaller scale intrastate conflicts change America's grand strategic calculus? This paper seeks to explore this issue and we develop two key arguments. 1 Barry Posen is one of the few retrenchers that briefly mentions intrastate conflict but even here it is only with respect to large, boots-on-the-ground interventions. First, we examine US coercive statecraft and argue that the US's post-war project of liberal international order building had both a militarised but also a political economic component.
'Deep engagers' often posit the merit of defense commitments in achieving economic outcomes, suggesting that 'the United States gets better economic bargains or increased economic cooperation on some specific issues than it would if it did not play such a key security role' 5 whilst 'retrenchers' argue that deep engagement advocates ' ignore the extent to which past U.S. military activism has actually undermined market stability and upset vital regions.' Both have 6 merit, but neither systematizes intrastate arguments into their broader grand strategic logics which, we argue is a significant omission as it is often these forms of intrastate security regimes that gives the US significant leverage in shaping the economic preferences of recipient states. In short, these sub-state intrastate forms of security assistance have also formed a key means through which the US has helped structure specific forms of political and economic governance that it has considered conducive to its broader global leadership role. As noted, both 'schools' recognise this but do not drill down to explore this at the intrastate level and the potential implications this has for the wider grand strategic debates.
Second, the shared focus on interstate conflict cannot on its own theoretical terms address the ways in which either retrenchment or a re-calibrated variant of deep engagement would deal with or influence forms of internal instability that may emerge from changes in American force posture. For example, how would US offshore balancing deal with domestic instability or sub-state actors, or US supported 'onshore' proxies deter forms of intrastate instability?
Minimally, given the pervasive, historically intense and ongoing nature of intrastate conflict, 7 grand strategy debates should widen the optic through which US coercive statecraft is understood. Rather than a strict interstate / intrastate binary, we argue it is helpful to conceptualize conflict across a broader strategic continuum that encompasses both of these However, the current scholarship on US grand strategy significantly underweights intrastate conflict, and that presents an interesting theoretical challenge given the scholarship's emphasis on interstate balances of power acting to mitigate threats to US national security interests; are intrastate conflicts beyond interstate balancing?
We proceed as follows. First we cover the theoretical debates and assumptions underpinning the analysis of grand strategy. Second, we present our database of US military operations, and drawing on official budgetary data and private and official arms sales reports, present a breakdown of the resources expended on military aid and training from 1990 onwards. Where data granularity permits, we also specify a more detailed analysis of aggregate security assistance and arms sales data throughout the 2000s in the Middle East, Latin America and Africa. In the third and final section we then propose a theoretical resolution that seeks to reconcile these theoretical debates to the empirical material.
Interstate Conflict and Grand Strategy
Within grand strategic debates, great power relationships tend to be the central objects of analysis. Whilst justifiable given the capacity of major interstate war to change global balances of power or impact on core US national security interests, it has often meant the occlusion of substate level conflict in the discussion and analysis of grand strategy. Historically, the US has been engaged in a large number of smaller scale security assistance and training programs. As Iraqi Freedom, these wars represented significant or perceived threats to national security interests, where the political risk to the nation was always gravest. These were the wars for which the military traditionally prepared; these were the wars that endangered America's very way of life. Of the hundreds of other military operations conducted in those intervening years, most are now considered stability operations, where the majority of effort consisted of stability tasks. Contrary to popular belief, the military history of the United States is one characterized by stability operations, interrupted by distinct episodes of major combat.' 8 Thus, while strategic discourse focuses on the threat of major war, many of the day-to-day applications of American military power concern more routine and smaller scale operations to stabilise other nations in order to defend and expand the US-led liberal international order that has both an political and economic component. military commitments coalescence around a US-centric status quo thereby institutionally instantiating sets of American preferences. In short, 'what the United States wants from the economic order is simply "more of the same"' and the best way to achieve that is to raise the costs of revising the system whilst keeping the benefits of a pacified security system coming.
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However, the historical record suggests a far more hands on element to this economic logic.
That is, whilst we agree with the arguments made in favour of micro and macro-level structuring at the interstate level, there are important intrastate dynamics as well, most of which are missing from much of the theoretical literature on US grand strategy and problematic not least (as we develop below) as they miss the ways in which these sub-state security regimes have allowed the US to configure a specific form of international order.
For instance, Posen's recent work, Restraint , arguably one of the most in depth arguments for American retrenchment, hardly covers the wider economic implications of grand strategic adjustment. In keeping with many scholars writing in favour of retrenching from American deep engagement, the economic aspects of US grand strategy only examines the 'blood and treasure' costs associated with military adventurism. That is, the casualty rates of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as on the how much more, proportionally, the United States spends on defence relative to its alliance partners. By doing so, Posen also conflates contemporary military adventurism with the broader strategy of deep engagement, attempting to draw a connection between recent strategic failures and grand strategic doctrine. However, this is problematic.
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After all, a grand strategy does not tell us much about specific policy decisions themselves, but rather aims to inform the manner in which planning and deployment are approached more generally. Strategic doctrine is a set of concepts and principles that guides the allocation of national resources to achieve national interests. Consequently, by definition, it 'cannot tell us about the optimality of decisions outside the strategy's core logic'. 13 However, Posen's omission of economic and intrastate factors is far from unique. Most of the key works on grand strategy in the last decade or so have primarily focused on force posture 
US Intrastate order making
In the post-war period, the US steadily cultivated very close ties with numerous militaries around the world, justified as a necessary step in the fight against global communism. Pro-US states, protected by strong security forces, were thus incorporated into the US-led order as allies and strategic buttresses. Importantly, this form of order management principally relied upon the defense of recipient states and elites through forms of internal defense re-orientation for managing forms of internal order. These intrastate regimes became a central component of US power, and the commitments took on a range of levels of engagement. If we take just one example of the military training programmes run by the US, the International Military Education and Training (IMET) programme, over 700,000 foreign officers have passed through its programmes since 1950 at a cost of over $3 billion. The programme continues to train thousands today.
17
Throughout the Cold War, the justification for these close military to military contacts was frequently one of anti-communism linked to the bipolar competition with the USSR. As such, 16 Brooks & Wohlforth, America Abroad, 81 17 U.S. Department of State, "International Military Education and Training Account Summary" 2016. http://www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/sat/c14562.htm domestic instability became the key threat to US interests over and above interstate wars, which, given mutually assured destruction and strategic tripwires were far less frequent than the many covert proxy wars and US and Soviet backed insurgency and counterinsurgency campaigns.
Given the often fragile social bases of a number of pro-US states during the Cold War, coupled with rapid decolonization in the post-war period, it is perhaps unsurprising that the vast majority of US military operations were dedicated to domestic security assistance.
Although the rationales changed in the post-Cold War period, this form of intrastate order mediation has not changed significantly. The 2008 Stability Operations manual notes, the "greatest threats to our national security will not come from emerging ambitious states but from nations unable or unwilling to meet the basic needs and aspirations of their people" with US operations designed to 'rebuild the institutions of government and market economy that provide the foundations for enduring peace and stability' which is the 'essence of stability operations'. In a more general sense, the operations that the American military often undertake seek to address "capacity deficits" which are taken as indicative of failing state infrastructure that reinforce the propensity for instability. These domestic deficits include, amongst others, "systemic economic stagnation" and "scarcity of necessary resources" with proposed solutions 22 including the implementation of the "rule of law, developing human capital, providing social welfare, providing security, managing the use of force, and establishing commercial markets." This omission in the grand strategic literature becomes theoretically more interesting when we consider the fact that interstate balances of power are often posited as the means by which US force posture can be recalibrated without having to worry too much about about possible post-American regional security orders developing in ways that may be inimical to US national security interests. When we factor this intrastate element to grand strategic calculations, how can interstate balances of power prevent possible negative intrastate conflict dynamics from developing? This is arguably most problematic for 'offshore balancers' whose reliance on post-retrenchment pro-US 'onshore balancers' operates almost entirely at the interstate level. In essence then, new post-American regional balances of power, the mechanism that operationalises its capacity to choose retrenchment, operates entirely at the interstate level with at present little analysis of intrastate dynamics. Our call is not to necessarily give equal weighting to this interstate / intrastate dyad in American strategic calculations, but we have hoped to demonstrate that minimally, this sub-state dimension should find its way into grand strategic debates when weighing US options, not least because of its prevelance. As we covered earlier, 'deep engagement' advocates do tend to more directly integrate political-economic arguments into their analyses, but there is a tendency to omit evaluation of internal order making in favour of those mechanisms that address grander interstate developments. In terms of impact, and 26 particularly resources, while there is a sound justification for the primacy accorded to interstate dynamics, this does not equate to largely ignoring intrastate developments. In this sense, the lack of engagement can only contribute to underspecify our understanding of the role of American power in generating desired international outcomes; particularly, as we have identified above, intrastate dynamics have played such a pervasive role in American statecraft.
In the following section we empirically underscore this by examining the contributions that security assistance and stability operations have made to achieving US economic and strategic objectives. We focus the analysis on the funds and resources allocated to Latin America, the investments can be seen in reports detailing the progress of these programs, with concern that violence in Mexico "threaten[s] citizen security and governance" immediately followed by the observation Mexico is a "country with which the United States shares a nearly 2,000-mile border and more than $500 billion in annual trade."
This isn't all that surprising. with its economic and political stability long considered vitally important to the security and prosperity of the United States. In reality these funds seem to have been rather limited, albeit potentially effective, payoffs to make an often irksome partner more amenable to US interests. Nigerian military training has a number of economic linkages. Nigeria is Africa's most populous nation, largest economy and the largest recipient of US FDI primarily directed to its petroleum and mining sectors. This is unsurprising given that Nigeria is Africa's largest oil producer, and a growing market for many Western and East Asian nations keen to diversify supply away from the Middle East. However, it is also a nation that has suffered for many years with a number of insurgent movements and criminal enterprises operating within its territory, contributing to significantly disrupt oil production. Due to recent events, Boko Haram, the Islamist group with 54 connections to the Islamic State, has taken centre stage as the most prominent insurgent group in the country. However, Nigeria has long experienced insurgent activity in the Niger Delta, a response to the tensions over oil exploration in the region and local perceptions of exploitation. 55 This, in turn, has also become mixed up with a surge in piracy that has been witnessed in the Gulf of Guinea, which itself intricately related to the broader disorder is emanating from the Delta itself. In 2013 it was reported that piracy in the Gulf Guinea surpassed that in the Gulf of 56 Aden, a development that shows up in the detailed breakdown of U.S. training programs, with a proportion of fiscal year 2014 expenditure tailored toward maritime protection training. 57 An interesting component of this relationship is that U.S. imports of Nigerian oil have collapsed over the last few years, falling from over 10% of U.S. imports to well under 1% as of late 2014. 58 In fact, in July of 2014 it was reported that the United States didn't import a single barrel. The Eastern oil producers combined with increasingly fraught domestic political environments for many of these nations, U.S. security assistance is, in fact, increasing. While many of these 62 states face barriers to assistance in respect to their human rights records and history of corruption and incompetence, growing Islamist insurgencies in many African nations have refocused priorities.
The above illustrates the role that these pervasive and diffuse funding streams, training programmes and arms sales have played in stabilising forms of political-economic order that are deemed valuable to American policy planners. Linked back to issues over strategic policy, these examples also provide a potentially interesting insight into the manner in which such activity contributes to achieving broader strategic objectives. Not only, as has been illustrated in a number of these cases, do these operations contribute to secure an attractive, positive-sum order for a number of other important nation states, but they often also help achieve outcome that the application of traditional, large scale military force is incapable of attaining. In these sense, they also tend to prove more fungible with regard to the objectives of the specific operation or funding stream, not to mention working out as proportionally and relatively cost effective.
A Strategic Continuum
In light of this, our analysis suggests that there are substantial limitations to isolating interstate balance of power dynamics as the sole causal element driving international competition. It is often necessary to look beyond interstate balances of power and analyse the manner in which foreign intervention, whether physical or financial, may come to influence relative power dynamics and strategic balances. This becomes particularly pertinent when we consider the role these processes have played in attaining strategic goals, whether that be the limited aims of 'access' to which US funds were put in Pakistan, through to long term stabilization of the security environment in regards to Israel and Egypt. The willingness to commit funds and training, if not engage in actual military operations, have formed vital components of US power projection and statecraft throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. In relation to ongoing debates in policy and scholarly communities regarding grand strategy, the absence of discussion on the topic is not unsurprising but the implications may be important. While there is considerable debate over the role that balance of power dynamics play in coming to fill the power gap left by proposed American retrenchment, there is an absence of discussion over what alterations (if any) would be made to intrastate stabilization operations and funds. Or, indeed, how they may factor into retrenched grand strategies more generally.
While deep engagement and retrenchment advocates argue over the relative merits and costs of different American force postures, they seldom discuss intrastate balances. In fact, intrastate interventions are often only used to illustrate the dangers of overextension; conflating rather controversial liberal democratic interventions with the broader, more frequent array of American interventions throughout the last century. As we have shown, this obscures a significant part of American international activity since at least 1900, where many deployments have been in support of smaller ambition, less intense intrastate interventions. While the deterrence and prevention of great power war is the obvious priority for American strategic planners and theorists, the exclusion of intrastate dynamics still retains significance. For instance, as we have shown, the United States has often used its security assistance streams to aid in attaining broader economic objectives. Whether this be stabilizing an allied regime or assisting through providing 'leverage' in attaining economic reforms, security assistance has on many occasions aided in creating and securing forms of political-economic order that benefit the United States, and that takes place alongside a broad strategic continuum based around both interstate and intrastate forms of conflict.
In figure 2, we provide a pictorial representation of such a continuum, labelling the strategic 'resolution' of key concepts in the literature. As we can see, traditional balancing dynamics are located firmly at the interstate end of the continuum, for the simple reason that they innately deal only with interstate power balances. The two concepts of 'micro-level structuring' and 'macro-level structuring', as offered by Brooks and Wohlforth, find themselves further down the scale, yet also stop short of dealing with specific intrastate dynamics.
But what exactly do these concepts cover? And how does conceptualising security assistance as an integral component in grand strategic resolution correct for the disconnect between the extant literature on grand strategy and the empirical work we laid out above?
As we covered in the literature review, intrastate dynamics are often omitted in the grand strategy scholarship which instead focuses on global balance of power considerations. In this sense, the strategic resolution employed often starts and ends at the interstate. The limited engagement with this problem is well characterised by Layne's response to concerns over 'environment shaping', that is arguments concerning "the consequences of Eurasia's political and ideological, as well as economic, closure." Suggesting that "this threat is easily exaggerated, and manipulated, to disguise ulterior motives for U.S. military intervention." Layne bases this 63 argument on the assumption that irrespective of American security assistance or military deployments, any given regional state still have a "stake in its own economic well-being...unlikely to hive itself off completely from international trade" itself a function of The broader point to make, however, is given that intrastate dynamics have been so central to American foreign policy over the last century, even offshore balancing strategies should articulate some detail of response to this problem. Even if that is, à la Layne, and more formal expression of disinterest based on a relative 'cost -benefit' analysis. That is, that the perception that the 'returns' on these operations do not exceed the efforts and risk involved in undertaking them.
A more complete analysis would therefore go a step further than this, adding in dynamics that operate at the intrastate level as well. For instance, theorising as to whether and how to mitigate the "significant security consequences associated with weak or failing states" finds little place in the aforementioned work, yet is mentioned in-depth in the United States National Security Strategy (NSS) of 2015. It remains to be seen how the Trump Administration will approach 66 these issues, but there is no reason to assume that intrastate conflicts will diminish in their intensity or prevalence. Equally, the problems associated with failed states are only a small part of the intrastate dynamics we cover above, demonstrating limitations in the existing official strategic documentation too. However, as our analysis hopes to demonstrate, great power 65 Layne, The Peace of Illusions , 177 66 The White House, "National Security Strategy" February 2015. https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy.pdf competition occurs at all levels of analysis simultaneously, limiting the resolution at which certain strategic doctrines and concepts are operational.
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Conclusion
At the moment, a large swath of the literature on US grand strategy focuses largely on interstate balances of power, omitting the intrastate dynamics that have proved vital in achieving broader strategic goals. This is justifiable given how transformational major interstate wars are for US national security interests. However, whilst on a lower order of threat, intrastate conflict and instability has played a major role in US coercive statecraft. Going forward, whether it is fighting Islamist terrorism in the Middle East, intervening in ongoing and bloody civil wars or engaging in intrastate proxy wars with great power rivals, they look likely to continue to be part of America's strategic calculus. Moreover, funding and involvement in intrastate conflict and competition has formed a vital component of the way in which the United States has promoted specific forms of regional political economy and maintained its global leadership. In short, the intrastate dimension matters. Our paper has attempted to address this element and relate it to grand strategic debates and called for a broader strategic continuum that, minimally, addresses these crucial intrastate conflict dynamics.
Just as importantly, we have attempted to demonstrate how this problem influences both major schools of grand strategic thought, broadly categorised as offshore balancing and deep engagement. As we have attempted to illustrate, and as the historiography of the Cold War aptly demonstrates, international competition takes place at all levels of analysis. Given this, an articulation of how, and at what level, a specific grand strategic logic operates is of importance to academic and policy oriented debates alike. For example, while key proponents of both strategies are adverse to 'liberal hegemonic' interventions this aversion explains very little about their attitudes to other forms of intrastate activity, despite the empirical prevalence and importance of 67 The core logic of a specific grand strategy can be married with a number (if not mixture) of different peripheral strategic logics, all of which may have corresponding implications for force posture and procurement patterns. See for example Derek Reveron, Exporting Security: International Engagement, Security Cooperation, and the Changing Face of the U.S. Military (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2010) these forms of competition and conflict. A problem we believe can be addressed by a broader strategic continuum that extends analysis beyond interstate distributions of power.
